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INTRODUCTION 
In spring of 2010, Anthony Elonis’s wife left him, taking their two 
children with her.1 Shortly thereafter, Elonis began posting violent and 
degrading material, frequently styled as “rap lyrics,” on Facebook.2 After 
Elonis posted an illustrated diagram depicting his wife’s home and 
provided hypothetical instructions on the best way to “fire a mortar 
launcher at her house,” she sought a protective order.3 Elonis learned of 
the order and redirected the focus of his threatening posts to include 
police officers, FBI agents, and even a kindergarten class.4  
A grand jury indicted Elonis for five counts of violating 18 U.S.C. 
§ 875(c), a federal statute criminalizing the transmission of “any 
communication containing any threat . . . to injure the person of another.”5 
At trial, Elonis asked the court to instruct the jury that “the government 
must prove that he intended to communicate a true threat.”6 The district 
                                                                                                                     
 * J.D. 2016, University of Florida Levin College of Law; B.S. 2013, University of 
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 1. Elonis v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2001, 2004 (2015).  
 2. See id. at 2004–07.  
 3. Id. at 2005–06.  
 4. Id. at 2006–07.  
 5. Id. at 2007 (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting 18 U.S.C. 
§ 875(c) (2012)).  
 6. Id. (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks omitted).  
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court declined and instead instructed the jury to use an objective, 
“reasonable person” standard; the jury subsequently found Elonis guilty 
of four of the five counts against him.7 Elonis filed an appeal in the U.S. 
Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, challenging the district court’s 
jury instruction, but the Third Circuit found no error in the instruction and 
affirmed the lower court’s judgment.8 In 2014, the U.S. Supreme Court 
granted certiorari, and in 2015 it reviewed and reversed the Third 
Circuit’s decision.9 The Court looked to the principles underlying 
criminal law and statutory construction and concluded a reasonable 
person standard, by itself, is not enough to justify criminal liability.10 The 
Court instead held that a defendant convicted under § 875(c) must have 
subjective intent to convey a threat.11 Despite its willingness to require a 
subjective intent standard, the Court refused to specify which level of 
intent—recklessness or knowledge—would suffice to violate the statute, 
nor did it address the apparent First Amendment concerns relevant to the 
decision.12 Lower courts must now find their own answers to the intent 
question and hope that their choice fits within the additional restraints 
imposed by the First Amendment. 
I.  HISTORY OF § 875(C) 
In its earliest form, § 875(c) criminalized threats mailed with the 
“intent to extort.”13 Several years after the statute’s enactment, Congress 
revised it to prohibit all threats to injure another person, regardless of 
whether the threat accompanied an extortion attempt.14 Although the 
original statute required “intent” behind the communication, the current 
version of § 875(c) prohibits “any communication containing any 
                                                                                                                     
 7. United States v. Elonis, 897 F. Supp. 2d 335, 341–42 (E.D. Penn. 2012), aff’d, 730 F.3d 
321 (3d Cir. 2013), rev’d, 135 S. Ct. 2001 (2015). In full, the court instructed the jury that:  
A statement is made a true threat when a defendant intentionally makes a 
statement in a context or under such circumstances wherein a reasonable person 
would foresee that the statement would be interpreted by those to whom the 
maker communicates the statement as a serious expression of an intention to 
inflict bodily injury or take the life of an individual.  
Id. at 341 n.5.  
 8. United States v. Elonis, 730 F.3d 321, 327, 335 (3d Cir. 2013), rev’d, 135 S. Ct. 2001 
(2015).   
 9. Elonis, 135 S. Ct. at 2008, 2012.  
 10. See id. at 2009–11. 
 11. Id.  
 12. See id. at 2012.  
 13. Pub. L. No. 76-76, § 1(c), 53 Stat. 742 (1939). 
 14. 18 U.S.C. § 408d(b) (1940). 
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threat.”15 The disappearance of the statute’s intent element received little 
attention or explanation,16 and courts slowly began applying the statute’s 
plain language—requiring only that the defendant “knowingly” 
transmitted the communication.17 
The Supreme Court confirmed Congress’s authority to regulate threats 
in Watts v. United States.18 In Watts, the Court considered the 
constitutionality of a statute that prohibited “any person from ‘knowingly 
and willfully [making] any threat’” to kill or injure the President.19 The 
Court acknowledged that the country has a valid interest in protecting its 
President from the fear and interference caused by threats, but tempered 
its finding with the warning that courts must interpret any statute 
criminalizing pure speech within the bounds of the First Amendment.20 
With this ruling, the Court established an exception to the First 
Amendment for “true threats” and implicitly confirmed the 
constitutionality of other federal threat statutes, including § 875(c).  
In 2003, the Supreme Court again considered the constitutionality of 
a threat statute. Virginia v. Black21 involved a Virginia statute “banning 
cross burning with ‘an intent to intimidate a person or group of 
persons.’”22 The primary First Amendment concerns arose not from the 
statute itself but from the instruction to a jury “that the burning of a cross 
by itself is sufficient evidence from which you may infer the required 
intent.”23 The Court gave great weight to the intimidation and hatred that 
have long accompanied cross burnings.24 However, the plurality reasoned 
                                                                                                                     
 15. 18 U.S.C. § 875(c) (2012) (emphasis added).  
 16. See Thomas “Tal” DeBauche, Note, Bursting Bottles: Doubting the Objective-Only 
Approach to 18 U.S.C. 875(c) in Light of United States v. Jeffries and the Norms of Online Social 
Networking, 51 HOUS. L. REV. 981, 996–97 (2014). 
 17. See, e.g., United States v. Holder, 302 F. Supp. 296, 300 (D. Mont. 1969) (“It is 
sufficient to establish a specific intent to communicate a threat to injure . . . , i.e. the 
communication of the threat must be done ‘knowingly’ and not ‘because of mistake or 
inadvertence or other innocent reason.’”), aff’d, 427 F.2d 715 (9th Cir. 1970). 
 18. 394 U.S. 705 (1969).  
 19. Id. at 705, 707. 
 20. Id. at 707 (“What is a threat must be distinguished from what is constitutionally 
protected speech.”). 
 21. 538 U.S. 343 (2003) (plurality opinion).  
 22. Id. at 347 (quoting VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-423 (1996)). 
 23. Id. at 349 (internal quotation marks omitted). The jury instruction was based on a 
provision from the statute which read: “Any such burning of a cross shall be prima facie evidence 
of an intent to intimidate a person or group of persons.” Id. at 348 (internal quotation marks 
omitted). The Court explained that the Virginia Supreme Court had never clarified the meaning 
of that provision. Id. at 364.  
 24. Id. at 352–57. For this reason, the plurality concluded that the statute itself was 
constitutional because a cross burning “with an intent to intimidate” constitutes a “true threat,” 
which the First Amendment does not protect. Id. at 359–60. The Court elaborated:  
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that under some circumstances a cross burning can be “core political 
speech.”25 Because the First Amendment may, under some 
circumstances, protect a cross burning, and because the statute expressly 
required an intent to intimidate, the jury instruction’s interpretation of the 
statute was unconstitutional.26 The Court vacated Black’s conviction 
because the instruction permitted the jury to ignore “all of the contextual 
factors that are necessary to decide whether a particular cross burning is 
intended to intimidate.”27 
Although Black was a plurality opinion on a fairly specific 
construction of a state statute, the circuit courts began hearing arguments 
that the “intent” reasoning from Black should apply to threats in cases 
brought under § 875(c).28 Generally, § 875(c) is divided into two 
elements: first, a communication must be transmitted, and second, the 
communication must contain a threat.29 With regard to the first element, 
courts typically maintained that defendants only needed to have “general 
intent” to “knowingly” transmit the message to be convicted under the 
statute.30 Likewise, the majority of circuits dismissed the possibility that 
the statute’s second element required that defendants have a separate, 
                                                                                                                     
“True threats” encompass those statements where the speaker means to 
communicate a serious expression of an intent to commit an act of unlawful 
violence to a particular individual or group of individuals. The speaker need not 
actually intend to carry out the threat. Rather, a prohibition on true threats 
“protect[s] individuals from the fear of violence” and “from the disruption that 
fear engenders,” in addition to protecting people “from the possibility that the 
threatened violence will occur.” 
Id. (alteration in original) (citations omitted) (quoting R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 
388 (1992)). 
 25. Id. at 365. 
 26. Id. at 363–64. 
 27. Id. at 367. Note that the Court did not strike down the entire statute. Id. Instead, the 
Court left it to the Virginia courts to determine whether the statute could ever be interpreted in a 
way that complied with the First Amendment. Id.  
 28. See, e.g., United States v. Martinez, 736 F.3d 981, 985 (11th Cir. 2013) (“Martinez 
argues that the Supreme Court’s decision in Virginia v. Black draws the distinction between true 
threats and protected speech based on the speaker’s subjective intent.”), vacated, 135 S. Ct. 2798 
(2015), to be considered in light of Elonis v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2001 (2015).  
 29. See Elonis v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2001, 2008 (2015). Some interpretations of the 
statute identify a third, interstate commerce element. See, e.g., id. at 2014 (Alito, J., concurring in 
part and dissenting in part). Any difference between the two tests, however, has no bearing on the 
discussion within this Comment.  
 30. See, e.g., United States v. White, 670 F.3d 498, 508 (4th Cir. 2012) (finding § 875(c) to 
be a “general intent crime”), abrogated by 810 F.3d 212 (4th Cir. 2016); United States v. Stewart, 
411 F.3d 825, 827 & n.2 (7th Cir. 2005) (“When the word knowingly is used in these instructions, 
it means that the Defendant realized what he was doing and was aware of the nature of his conduct 
and did not act through ignorance or mistake or accident.”). 
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subjective intent to make a threat.31 Whether the message constituted a 
“true threat,” and thus was not entitled to First Amendment protection, 
hinged on how an objective, reasonable person would interpret the 
statement.32 Because the threatening nature of a message was determined 
without reference to the defendant’s intention or understanding, there was 
little room for defendants to challenge the second element. Thus, 
defendants were only able to introduce somewhat subjective evidence to 
challenge the first element. For example, a defendant could attempt to 
defend himself by arguing that he sent the message by mistake.33 
By 2015, only two circuits—the Ninth and Tenth Circuits—had 
adopted an additional requirement that a defendant have subjective intent 
to make a threat.34 The Model Penal Code lists four levels of intent, from 
greatest to least culpability: purpose, knowledge, recklessness, and 
negligence.35 Of these categories, only purpose, knowledge, and 
recklessness require “subjective intent.”36 Thus, courts applying a 
subjective test ask whether the defendant communicated a message with 
the purpose of making a threat, was “practically certain” the recipient 
would view the message as a threat, or consciously disregarded a 
“substantial and unjustifiable risk” the recipient would understand the 
message as a threat.37 While the Tenth Circuit requires some subjective 
                                                                                                                     
 31. See United States v. Clemens, 738 F.3d 1, 9–12 (1st Cir. 2013); United States v. Turner, 
720 F.3d 411, 420 (2d Cir. 2013), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 49 (2014); United States v. Elonis, 730 
F.3d 321, 327, 330 (3d Cir. 2013), rev’d, 135 S. Ct. 2001 (2015); United States v. Nicklas, 713 
F.3d 435, 440 (8th Cir. 2013); Martinez, 736 F.3d at 988; White, 670 F.3d at 508; United States 
v. Jeffries, 692 F.3d 473, 477–79 (6th Cir. 2012); Stewart, 411 F.3d at 828; Porter v. Ascension 
Parish Sch. Bd., 393 F.3d 608, 616 (5th Cir. 2004). The U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of 
Columbia did not decide the issue before the Supreme Court decided Elonis. 
 32. See, e.g., United States v. Stock, 728 F.3d 287, 293 n.5 (3d Cir. 2013) (“A statement or 
communication is a threat if it was made under such circumstances that a reasonable person 
hearing or reading the statement or receiving the communication would understand it as a serious 
expression of an intent to inflict injury.”). The majority of circuits used an objective test that 
looked to the reaction of the reasonable recipient, but a few courts used an alternative test that 
weighed the reasonable defendant’s ability to foresee that the recipient would view the message 
as a threat. See United States v. Fulmer, 108 F.3d 1486, 1491 (1st Cir. 1997) (reviewing the 
various objective standards employed by other circuit courts).  
 33. See Fulmer, 108 F.3d at 1493 (instructing the jury that the defendant “knowingly” 
transmitted the message if he “did not act out of ignorance, mistake, or accident”).  
 34. See United States v. Heineman, 767 F.3d 970, 978 (10th Cir. 2014); United States v. 
Twine, 853 F.2d 676, 680 (9th Cir. 1988). 
 35. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(2)(a)–(d) (2015).  
 36. See Karen Rosenfield, Note, Redefining the Question: Applying a Hierarchical 
Structure to the Mens Rea Requirement for Section 875(c), 29 CARDOZO L. REV. 1837, 1842–43 
(2008). Negligence, however, is an objective test which typically only considers whether a 
reasonable person—not the defendant—“should be aware” of the risk. MODEL PENAL CODE 
§ 2.02(2)(d). 
 37. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(2)(a)–(c). 
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intent, it has declined to identify which level of intent § 875(c) requires.38 
The Ninth Circuit requires at least “knowledge” that the recipient will 
view the communication as a threat.39  
The subjective intent element does not replace either of the tests 
required by the majority of circuits, rather, it is included as an additional 
analysis under the statute’s second, true threat element.40 Subjective 
intent determinations turn on more than the defendant’s explanations of 
their intentions—juries may consider the entire context of the defendant’s 
statements, including the tone of the statements, the defendant’s 
relationship with people mentioned in the statements, the defendant’s 
prior warnings regarding threatening statements, and any other relevant 
circumstances.41 Subjective intent also potentially allows for additional 
defenses that are not available under objective or general intent analyses, 
including the lack of requisite intent due to intoxication or diminished 
capacity.42  
II.  ELONIS V. UNITED STATES AND A FAILURE TO CLARIFY INTENT 
The Supreme Court’s holding in Elonis v. United States43 rejected the 
position of nine circuit courts and determined that § 875(c) requires that 
a defendant subjectively intended to communicate a threat.44 The Court 
began its evaluation of the statutory requirements with a reading of the 
statute’s plain language.45 The Court rejected both parties’ arguments for 
inferring a mental state from the statutory language and concluded that, 
                                                                                                                     
 38. See Heineman, 767 F.3d at 973 & n.2; see also id. at 983 (Baldock, J., concurring in 
judgment only) (indicating that the court declined to decide the appropriate level of intent). 
 39. See Twine, 853 F.2d at 680; see also United States v. King, 122 F.3d 808, 811 (9th Cir. 
1997) (Farris, J., concurring) (clarifying that the Twine court held that specific intent required 
knowledge or purpose). Interestingly, the Ninth Circuit reached this conclusion based on its own 
precedent, long before Virginia v. Black raised the subjective intent issue.  
 40. See United States v. Wheeler, 776 F.3d 736, 743 n.3 (10th Cir. 2015) (“This court’s 
recent decision in Heineman does not alter this standard. Heineman dealt solely with the mens rea 
required under § 875(c) and does not alter the objective, reasonable person standard for 
determining what constitutes a true threat.”); United States v. Vaksman, 472 Fed. Appx. 447, 448 
(9th Cir. 2012). Requiring a subjective and objective test again ensures that triers of fact only 
convict those defendants whose communications are understood as threats. Logically, if a 
defendant intends to make a threat, but no other reasonable person would understand the statement 
as a threat, there is no harm. 
 41. See Vaksman, 472 Fed. Appx. at 449.  
 42. See Twine, 853 F.2d at 679–81.  
 43. 135 S. Ct. 2001 (2015).  
 44. Id. at 2011.  
 45. Id. at 2008–09.  
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on its face, the statute does not require any intent.46 However, the Court 
decided that it would not view the absence of express intent as an 
intentional omission by Congress, stating, “We have repeatedly held that 
‘mere omission from a criminal enactment of any mention of criminal 
intent’ should not be read ‘as dispensing with it.’”47 To the contrary, 
principles of criminal law generally favor inclusion of some intent in 
order to distinguish the innocent from the guilty.48  
The Court carefully noted that when implying an intent requirement, 
“we read into the statute ‘only that mens rea which is necessary to 
separate wrongful conduct from otherwise innocent conduct.’”49 The 
district court’s jury instruction, which permitted conviction based solely 
on a reasonable person’s interpretation of his statements, bore a striking 
similarity to a negligence standard and could not have distinguished 
innocent from wrongful conduct because it failed to take into account 
Elonis’s reasons for making the statements.50 Beyond holding that 
negligence is insufficient to satisfy § 875(c), the Court refused to decide 
which level of intent—knowledge or recklessness—would support a 
conviction, on the grounds that the parties had not briefed the issue and 
there was no current circuit split.51 The Court further declined to address 
any attendant First Amendment issues, because it had already determined 
the jury instruction conflicted with principles of criminal law requiring 
subjective intent.52 
Both Justice Samuel Alito’s concurrence and Justice Clarence 
Thomas’s dissent took issue with the majority’s refusal to clarify the 
requisite level of intent, predicting the opinion would lead to confusion 
and inconsistency in the circuit courts.53 Justice Alito, in particular, went 
                                                                                                                     
 46. Id.; see also 18 U.S.C. § 875(c) (2012). Note that the Court used terms such as “mental 
state,” “mens rea,” and “scienter” interchangeably to indicate what this Comment refers to as 
“intent.”  
 47. Elonis, 135 S. Ct. at 2009 (quoting Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 250 
(1952)).  
 48. Id. In support of this finding, the Court cited five cases in which it imputed, to a variety 
of statutes, an additional intent requirement. See id. at 2009–10. What is notable about the cited 
precedent is that in each case the Court applied an additional knowledge requirement. See id.  
 49. Id. at 2010 (quoting Carter v. United States, 530 U.S. 255, 269 (2000)).  
 50. See id. at 2011.  
 51. See id. at 2012–13.  
 52. See id. at 2012. On the basis of its determination that the jury instruction was improper, 
the Court reversed the defendant’s conviction and remanded the case for consideration of whether 
the defendant had the requisite subjective intent. Id. at 2013.  
 53. See id. at 2013 (Alito, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); id. at 2018 (Thomas, 
J., dissenting). Justice Thomas’s dissent proceeded upon the understanding that common law 
obligated the majority to apply a “default rule” of general intent, in the absence of an express 
indication of Congress’s intent to “dispense with” a required mental state. See id. at 2019. This 
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into great detail explaining why the majority could have, and should have, 
gone further with its holding. He disagreed with the Court’s claim that 
the parties had not addressed their preferred level of intent and pointed to 
the parties’ responses at oral argument to queries regarding a recklessness 
standard.54 Justice Alito, while agreeing with the majority’s general 
finding that § 875(c) requires subjective intent, built on the opinion by 
declaring recklessness the appropriate level of intent.55 He reasoned that 
a recklessness standard would identify culpable conduct while stopping 
short of intruding on Congress’s legislative authority.56  
Justice Alito continued with an explanation of why a recklessness 
standard, if adopted, would not infringe on the First Amendment.57 He 
reiterated the lack of First Amendment protection for true threats, 
emphasizing their negligible social value and their serious emotional, and 
potentially physical, harms.58 He also highlighted an important paradox 
that persists in all threat jurisprudence: Any threat—whether the result of 
mistake, ill-attempted humor, or the worst of intentions—causes the same 
distress.59 Justice Alito concluded his constitutional discussion by 
asserting that a recklessness standard would not have an untenable 
“chilling effect”60 on constitutional speech.61  
As suggested by Justice Alito, the Elonis majority unnecessarily 
bypassed an opportunity to resolve the intent question and provide lower 
courts with a clear standard to apply in future § 875(c) cases. The reasons 
offered by the Court for avoiding a specific intent standard as well as a 
First Amendment analysis were not compelling. First, at the time the 
                                                                                                                     
Comment assumes the majority was correct in concluding § 875(c) requires some degree of 
specific, subjective intent and thus will not discuss the dissent’s reasoning at length.  
 54. Id. at 2014 (Alito, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Specifically, the 
Government argued that recklessness would be suitable, while Elonis argued for a higher standard. 
See id. Justice Alito reasoned that if the Court desired additional discussion of the intent level, it 
could request supplementary briefing or further argument, rather than deferring an answer to a 
question it was capable of resolving. Id.  
 55. Id. at 2014–15.  
 56. See id. at 2015.  
 57. See id. at 2016.  
 58. See id. Elonis’s contentions that his “rap lyrics” were “works of art” apparently did not 
impress Justice Alito. See id. Justice Alito dismissed the idea that “amateurs” who post on social 
media are entitled to the same protections as professional musicians, particularly considering the 
vastly different contexts of direct threats made online and threats made during a public 
performance. Id. Justice Alito further questioned the innocence of Elonis’s motives, considering 
evidence that Elonis posted the threats so that his wife would see them. See id. at 2017. 
 59. See id. at 2016.  
 60. See generally Leslie Kendrick, Speech, Intent, and the Chilling Effect, 54 WM. & MARY 
L. REV. 1633, 1639–40 (2013) (discussing and criticizing the chilling effect in First Amendment 
cases).  
 61. Elonis, 135 S. Ct. at 2017 (drawing a parallel to civil and criminal liability for libel). 
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Court decided Elonis, there was, arguably, the beginning of a circuit split 
between the Ninth and Tenth Circuit on the exact issue facing the Court—
whether § 875(c) requires a reckless or knowing level of intent.62 Thus, 
the Court could have resolved the emerging split without exceeding its 
authority. Second, as repeatedly stated in Supreme Court precedent, 
courts must interpret any statute regulating pure speech within the bounds 
of the First Amendment.63 Thus, even though the Court’s holding was 
derived solely from principles of criminal law and statutory construction, 
because it altered the interpretation of a statute restricting pure speech, 
the Court should have at least confirmed that the changes were consistent 
with First Amendment precedent.  
In light of the Supreme Court’s consistent line of precedent on mens 
rea inferences, as well as the numerous existing sources upon which the 
Court could have based its reasoning,64 it is surprising that the Elonis 
Court deferred a decision on the level of intent required for § 875(c). As 
noted above, the precedent cited in support of the Court’s ability to infer 
intent strongly suggests an additional conclusion—when the Court 
imputes a statutory mens rea requirement, it nearly always requires 
knowledge.65 In the context of § 875(c), a subjective intent of knowledge 
fits well with principles of statutory construction, is easily applied by 
circuit courts, and satisfies constitutional demands.  
  
                                                                                                                     
 62. See supra notes 38–39 and accompanying text. As mentioned above, the Ninth and 
Tenth Circuits, although both requiring subjective intent, have somewhat different approaches. 
The Ninth Circuit has established knowledge as the proper intent level, while the Tenth Circuit 
has yet to choose either knowledge or recklessness. While perhaps not precisely the typical 
“circuit split,” the two circuits’ differing approaches certainly indicate some level of uncertainty 
already existed in the lower courts when Elonis was decided.  
 63. See Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705, 707 (1969); see also Virginia v. Black, 538 
U.S. 343, 363 (2003) (plurality opinion). 
 64. For example, as Justice Alito argued in his concurrence, the majority had at its disposal 
the parties’ existing argument and could have requested additional arguments or supplemental 
briefs to consider the intent issue in greater depth. See Elonis v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2001, 
2014 (2015) (Alito, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Moreover, the Court could have 
given greater consideration to the arguments raised by Justice Alito in favor of a recklessness 
standard and perhaps weighed his reasoning against the Ninth Circuit’s basis for selecting a 
knowledge standard. Even the Model Penal Code offers a recommendation on selecting a degree 
of “culpability” when a statute is silent on the subject. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(3). In sum, 
the Court could have relied on any or all of these sources to gain sufficient knowledge and reach 
an informed opinion on the proper level of intent. 
 65. See supra note 48; see also Rosenfield, supra note 36, at 1865 (“Knowledge is a 
common denominator in the Supreme Court cases which considered a statute silent on the mens 
rea requirement.”). 
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III.  KNOWLEDGE IS THE LIKELY STANDARD FOR § 875(C) VIOLATIONS 
Preliminarily, it is interesting to note the Court’s tendency to ascribe 
a knowledge requirement when Congress fails to expressly provide for a 
particular mens rea requirement. To support its decision in Elonis, the 
majority cited at least five cases where the Court imputed a mens rea 
requirement and in each case, knowledge was the chosen standard.66 
Although such a small sample of cases certainly cannot predict which 
standard will ultimately prevail in § 875(c), the reasoning used in the 
cited cases is remarkably similar to that which decided Elonis. In each 
case, the majority emphasized the traditional requirement of an “evil-
meaning mind” to support a criminal conviction.67 The Court was careful 
to distinguish between public welfare offenses, which require no 
subjective intent for conviction and receive light punishment, and the 
criminal offense at issue in each case, which carried harsher penalties.68 
Notably, most of the offenses in the cited cases involve prohibited use, 
possession, or sale of certain items.69 Only one case, X-Citement Video, 
involved arguable First Amendment concerns.70 It is reasonable to 
believe that the Court will retain a similar, if not heightened, interest in 
identifying truly guilty conduct when assessing § 875(c), which runs a 
higher risk of proscribing constitutionally protected speech.  
A knowledge standard is also consistent with the majority’s expressed 
aim of selecting the level of intent that best separates the innocent from 
the morally culpable.71 Distinguishing between innocence and guilt in the 
context of threats is particularly difficult because, as implied by Justice 
Alito’s concurring opinion, the harm resulting from threats is often the 
same, regardless of the speaker’s intent.72 Thus, contrary to what some 
commentators suggest, it is unhelpful to measure “wrongfulness” relative 
                                                                                                                     
 66.  See Elonis, 135 S. Ct. at 2009–10 (citing Posters ‘N’ Things, Ltd. v. United States, 511 
U.S. 513 (1994); United States v. X-Citement Video, Inc., 513 U.S. 64 (1994); Staples v. United 
States, 511 U.S. 600 (1994); Liparota v. United States, 471 U.S. 419 (1985); Morissette v. United 
States, 342 U.S. 246 (1952)).  
 67. E.g., Morissette, 342 U.S. at 251.  
 68. Id. at 253–56. A violation of a public welfare offense often will “result in no direct or 
immediate injury to person or property but merely create the danger or probability of it which the 
law seeks to minimize.” Id. at 256. Violations of these regulations generally result in relatively 
minor punishments. Id. In contrast, § 875(c) carries a penalty of up to five years of imprisonment. 
18 U.S.C. § 875(c) (2012). 
 69. See, e.g., Liparota, 471 U.S. at 420 (food stamps); Posters ‘N’ Things, 511 U.S. at 515 
(drug paraphernalia); X-Citement Video, 513 U.S. at 66 (child pornography); Staples, 511 U.S. at 
602 (automatic weapons).  
 70. X-Citement Video, 513 U.S. at 71–72.   
 71. See Elonis, 135 S. Ct. at 2010. 
 72. See id. at 2016 (Alito, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).  
 
10
Florida Law Review, Vol. 68, Iss. 5 [2016], Art. 8
http://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol68/iss5/8
2016] SECTION 875(C): NOT FOR ALL INTENTS AND PURPOSES 1505 
 
to the harms the threat statute seeks to prevent.73 Instead, it makes more 
sense to focus on which level of intent seems most clearly culpable, 
considering the typical circumstances that would fall under each level of 
intent. For example, a defendant who attempts to delete any “friends” 
who could view his posts before commanding his “religious followers” 
to “kill cops” might evidence recklessness.74This behavior would 
typically be reckless because the statements are more general in nature, 
and most defendants would be aware of the substantial risk that posts on 
social media will become public, even after taking steps to make the post 
private. On the other hand, conduct like Elonis’s almost certainly 
qualifies as knowing.75 There was no suggestion that Elonis deleted 
Facebook friends or added privacy settings before posting threatening 
“lyrics,” many of which directly referenced specific people who would 
likely become aware of the posts.76 Comparing the two examples, the 
facts supporting knowing intent are much more evidently “wrongful” 
than those supporting recklessness. Thus, a knowledge requirement 
comports best with the Court’s stated intention to separate the innocent 
from the morally culpable.  
As a practical matter, the Ninth Circuit’s lengthy history of using a 
knowledge standard for § 875(c) will provide helpful guidance for other 
courts applying the standard for the first time. The Ninth Circuit’s cases 
are particularly instructive on which fact patterns may call for different 
treatment under the new standard. For example, as noted above, a 
knowledge requirement, which requires that a defendant is “practically 
certain” his message would be interpreted as a threat, may—unlike a 
recklessness standard—be defeated by a lack of requisite intent, for 
reasons including intoxication or diminished capacity.77 Another possible 
defense that was previously unavailable is that a defendant did not intend 
that anyone receive the message, because if the defendant did not mean 
to share the statement, then he could hardly be practically certain it would 
                                                                                                                     
 73. See Leading Case, Federal Threats Statute—Mens Rea and the First Amendment—
Elonis v. United States, 129 HARV. L. REV. 331, 337 (2015).  
 74. See infra note 78 and accompanying text. It is unlikely that a trier of fact could construe 
the same circumstances as rising to the level of knowing intent, which would require that the 
defendant was “practically certain” a recipient would interpret his posts as a threat. MODEL PENAL 
CODE § 2.02(2)(b) (2015). It is also important to note that a case involving these facts would not 
be defeated through the “knowing transmission” requirement, because the defendant intentionally 
posted the statements.  
 75. See Elonis, 135 S. Ct. at 2004–07; see also id. at 2016 (Alito, J., concurring in part and 
dissenting in part) (implying that Elonis may have even posted the statements with the purpose of 
threatening his wife).  
 76. See id. at 2004–07 (majority opinion).  
 77. See United States v. Twine, 853 F.2d 676, 679–81 (9th Cir. 1988). 
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be understood as anything, much less a threat.78 A more complicated 
scenario will require a jury to evaluate a defendant’s knowing 
transmission of a threat when the defendant was making the statements 
to a confidante.79 Courts, however, may be reluctant to apply a heightened 
knowledge standard, fearing it will hinder convictions of guilty parties. 
But outside of the fairly limited fact patterns discussed immediately 
above, the new subjective intent requirement is unlikely to substantially 
interfere with the ability to indict and convict defendants guilty of making 
threats.80 
A knowledge standard is also more likely than a recklessness standard 
to uphold the principles of the First Amendment. Although the Elonis 
majority seemed willing to set aside constitutional considerations, the 
First Amendment will undoubtedly factor in to any future clarification of 
§ 875(c)’s requisite intent. In selecting a standard, the Court will be 
careful to draw a clear line between threats and protected speech.81 
Although Justice Alito suggested in his concurrence that a recklessness 
standard would not offend the First Amendment, his conclusions seemed 
rooted more in discussion of the harms of threats than in identifiable 
precedent.82 He did, however, point to libel as an area of speech 
regulation that only requires a recklessness standard.83 Likewise, Justice 
Thomas’s dissent also condemned any inclusion of a heightened level of 
intent, arguing that providing additional safeguards would “make threats 
one of the most protected categories of unprotected speech.”84 Justice 
                                                                                                                     
 78. See, e.g., United States v. Wheeler, 776 F.3d 736, 739–41, 746 (10th Cir. 2015) 
(discussing the defendant’s contention that he believed he deleted all his Facebook friends before 
making the alleged threatening posts, then reversing and remanding the case for retrial due to the 
trial court’s refusal to instruct the jury that the defendant subjectively intended his Facebook posts 
to be threatening). 
 79. See, e.g., United States v. Houston, 792 F.3d 663, 665–68, 670 (6th Cir. 2015) 
(reversing, for plain error, defendant’s conviction due to improper jury instruction on the issue of 
intent, finding that a jury could view the defendant’s statements to his girlfriend as “venting his 
frustration”). Situations involving statements to a confidante, such as a close friend, romantic 
partner, or family member, become particularly complex when, like in the Houston case, someone 
who is not part of the conversation becomes aware of the statements. See id. at 665. While the 
confidante may have understood the statements as “venting,” and felt no need to report them to 
the police, an outside observer does not have the same understanding of the defendant’s typical 
behavior and may be more likely to view the statements as threatening. 
 80. See, e.g., Elonis, 135 S. Ct. at 2026 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (noting Government 
counsel’s remark: “I think Congress would well have understood that the majority of these cases 
probably [involved] people who intended to threaten” (alteration in original) (internal quotation 
marks omitted)). 
 81. See Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705, 707 (1969).  
 82. See Elonis, 135 S. Ct. at 2016–17 (Alito, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).  
 83. See id. at 2017.  
 84. See id. at 2027 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
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Thomas listed additional categories of unprotected speech requiring only 
general intent.85 Both of these viewpoints, however, overlook the more 
compelling example provided by the majority opinion—Supreme Court 
precedent requires a heightened, knowing intent for conviction under a 
statute criminalizing the distribution of child pornography.86 If the Court 
is willing to provide heightened First Amendment protection for those 
accused of distributing child pornography, it seems likely the Court will 
have no trouble applying a similarly heightened knowledge requirement 
for a conviction under the threat statute.87 
CONCLUSION 
Although the Court passed up the opportunity to reach a clear holding 
on whether § 875(c) requires reckless or knowing intent and likewise 
avoided the attendant First Amendment considerations, existing Supreme 
Court precedent and circuit court opinions provide helpful guidance. 
Courts can expect that if the Supreme Court reconsiders § 875(c)’s intent 
requirement in the future, it will almost certainly select a knowledge 
standard.88 Proceeding under this reasoning, courts have the benefit of 
Ninth Circuit case law, which has been applying a subjective, knowing 
intent element to § 875(c) for nearly thirty years.89 By relying on the 
Court’s precedent and Ninth Circuit guidance, lower courts may avoid 
the confusion predicted by Justices Alito and Thomas90 and have a greater 
degree of confidence that their chosen standard complies with the 






                                                                                                                     
 85. See id. (discussing the “fighting words” exception’s general intent standard). However, 
the “fighting words” exception is one of the more archaic—not to mention one of the most 
criticized—exceptions to the First Amendment. See generally Burton Caine, The Trouble with 
“Fighting Words”: Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire Is a Threat to First Amendment Values and 
Should Be Overruled, 88 MARQ. L. REV. 441, 444 (2004) (“There is no constitutional basis for 
denying protection to fighting words . . . .”); Wendy B. Reilly, Note, Fighting the Fighting Words 
Standard: A Call for Its Destruction, 52 RUTGERS L. REV. 947, 949 (2000) (criticizing the 
development and application of the fighting words standard).  
 86. See Elonis, 135 S. Ct. at 2010 (majority opinion) (citing United States v. X-Citement 
Video, Inc., 513 U.S. 64, 73 (1994)).  
 87. See Kendrick, supra note 60, at 1666 (“The fact that sexual speech receives more 
protection than production of some public information [in certain defamation cases] makes it all 
the more difficult to rationalize the existing intent requirements . . . .”). 
 88. See supra note 65 and accompanying text. 
 89. See, e.g., United States v. Twine, 853 F.2d 676, 680 (9th Cir. 1988). 
 90. See Elonis, 135 S. Ct. at 2013 (Alito, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); id. at 
2018 (Thomas, J., dissenting).  
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